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Abstract
Internet routing can often be sub-optimal, with the chosen
routes providing worse performance than other available
policy-compliant routes. This stems from the lack of visibility
into route performance at the network layer. While this is an
old problem, we argue that recent advances in programmable
hardware finally open up the possibility of performance-aware
routing in a deployable, BGP-compatible manner.
We introduce ROUTESCOUT, a hybrid hardware/software
system supporting performance-based routing at ISP scale.
In the data plane, ROUTESCOUT leverages P4-enabled hard-
ware to monitor performance across policy-compliant route
choices for each destination, at line-rate and with a small
memory footprint. ROUTESCOUT’s control plane then asyn-
chronously pulls aggregated performance metrics to synthe-
size a performance-aware forwarding policy.
We show that ROUTESCOUT can monitor performance
across most of an ISP’s traffic, using only 4 MB of memory.
Further, its control can flexibly satisfy a variety of operator
objectives, with sub-second operating times.
1 Introduction
Internet routing uses cost-driven policies to select one in-
terdomain path per destination along which to direct traffic.
To select one path amongst multiple policy-compliant ones,
the Internet’s Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) uses partic-
ularly crude criteria rather than dynamically optimizing for
performance. For instance, BGP will favor paths crossing
fewer networks or paths crossing networks whose identifiers
are smaller.1 As a result, BGP selects routes that are often
suboptimal in terms of throughput, latency, and reliability.
This problem is far from new and the sub-optimality of
Internet routing is long-established [54, 59, 60]. Yet, despite
several strong attempts [8–11,54,62], few practical progresses
have been made. The problem is that enabling performance-
aware routing is particularly challenging requiring: scalable
monitoring of path performance, handling path dynamics,
stability and correctness of routing, and insurmountable resis-
tance to any approach incompatible with BGP.
Despite the problem’s difficulty and its long history, we
posit its time to revisit this problem, for three reasons.
First, Internet application requirements have evolved, with
a sharper focus on reliably high network performance. For hy-
perscale Web services with numerous well-connected points-
of-presence across the globe, BGP is, in fact, good enough
1One of BGP tie-breaking criteria is indeed to prefer routes announced
by the router with the smallest IP address [51].
most of the time [12]. However, even in these best-case en-
vironments, the benefits of reducing tail latency and perfor-
mance variability in response to transient congestion are valu-
able enough for providers like Google and Facebook to invest
in performance-aware routing [55, 65]. Google’s Espresso
showed that being able to dynamically reroute around tran-
sient congestion improved mean time between rebuffers in
their video service by 35–170% [65]. Espresso explicitly pins
these gains on being able to dynamically respond to perfor-
mance variability across paths (rather than just average-case
improvement from an one-time evaluation), thus underscor-
ing the need for making path decisions based on continuous
assessments of the changing performance of paths. Beyond
Web services, other applications are even more demanding:
in gaming, even small latency overheads can put players at a
disadvantage [27]. The importance of tail latency as opposed
to mean latency is also demonstrated on CDN’s efforts to
improve latency of the worst-performing clients [19]. Thus, if
performance-aware routing were practical, the benefits would
justify significant design effort.
Second, the available paths are increasingly diverse, due to
increased peering and the establishment of Internet Exchange
Points (IXPs), which simply did not exist at the time of BGP’s
first design iteration (1989). Further, if plans for satellite-
based global Internet connectivity [18, 58] come to fruition,
the performance gap across different paths will also increase.
Two teams of researchers have separately argued in recent
position papers [14, 43] that these satellite systems exhibit
continuous changes in both the performance and availability
of routes, and thus, will pose challenges to the performance-
oblivious and slow-to-converge BGP routing.
Third, the recent development of programmable switches
that allow line-rate, per-packet data plane operations enables
new design primitives. These heretofore unavailable primi-
tives, as we shall show, drastically improve our ability to both
evaluate and control multiple candidate routes.
Motivated by the above factors, we present ROUTESCOUT,
a novel software-hardware co-design for performance-aware
routing. ROUTESCOUT’s data plane estimates loss and delay
along different policy-compliant next-hop routes for differ-
ent destinations. It leverages probabilistic data structures in
programmable switches to aggregate delay and loss measure-
ments on a per destination-nexthop granularity. This in-data-
plane aggregation eliminates the necessity of mirroring traffic
to more powerful general purpose hardware, thus alleviating:
(a) bandwidth and compute overheads; and (b) deterioration
in monitoring capabilities when they are most needed, under
congestion. Past methods (§2) are incapable of producing
1
ar
X
iv
:2
00
1.
07
81
7v
1 
 [c
s.N
I] 
 21
 Ja
n 2
02
0
such accurate, high-coverage, real-time, and low-overhead
performance measurements for multiple candidate nexthops
for a large number of destinations.
The succinct measurements allow ROUTESCOUT’s con-
trol plane to evaluate multiple policy-compliant candidate
paths by measuring their performance systematically for small
slices of live traffic. ROUTESCOUT then encodes the best
path choices in the data plane using a small memory foot-
print. ROUTESCOUT enforces those choices gradually, while
continually monitoring performance to avoid self-induced
congestion and, therefore, oscillations [29].
While ROUTESCOUT could be used by any Autonomous
System (AS), for tractability of control, we trim the problem’s
scope: we take the perspective of a stub AS which offers no
transit services to other ASes. This eliminates the risk of con-
flicting decision-making leading to transient loops and insta-
bility. We humbly suggest that this “relaxation” still leads to
a highly non-trivial and useful setting: stubs comprise 85% of
all ASes;2 the majority of stubs are multi-homed and virtually
all Internet traffic and originates from some stub. In addition,
despite sitting at the edge of the Internet, stubs often know
several paths to reach each destination: our measurements on
CAIDA AS-level topologies [2] reveal that the majority of
them (55%) can use at least two equally-preferred paths for at
least 80% of the destinations.3 Stubs also tend to connect with
their neighbors via redundant links, further increasing path
diversity [46]. Finally, while ROUTESCOUT can only control
paths from the stub, not towards it, the resulting reductions in
round-trip time, and being able to avoid congestion/failures
at least in one direction, are still valuable improvements.
ROUTESCOUT is carefully designed to run on available
programmable switches, respecting constraints on memory,
operations per packet, memory accesses per packet, and con-
straints on accesses to memory blocks across pipeline stages.
It requires no coordination across ASes and works over un-
modified BGP. Within an AS, it yields benefits starting with
only one programmable switch deployed at the edge.
Our main contributions are the following:
• ROUTESCOUT, a system capable of rerouting traffic to test
the performance of alternative routes to each destination
prefix, in a controlled and automated manner.
• Methods to compute delay and loss rates across different
paths that are accurate and effective, while respecting the
constraints of data-plane hardware.
• Efficient interconnection between the control and data plane
that allows: (a) fast, fine-grained, and asynchronous changes
in the forwarding and monitoring policy; (b) fast, fine-
grained, and low-bandwidth retrieval of statistics.
• An implementation of ROUTESCOUT on a Barefoot Tofino
switch [5], with an evaluation of its control- and data-plane.
2A likely low estimate, computed from CAIDA’s AS-level topology [2].
3For each stub we calculated the number of BGP-equivalent paths for
1000 randomly selected destination prefixes, following [28].
2 Motivation
Performance-aware routing is an old problem [8,10,54,59,60],
with several known solutions of varying ambition and com-
plexity. Early work [31] narrowly targeted multi-homed end-
users with perfect visibility over their performance, cost being
their first priority, and direct links the only possible bottleneck.
TeXCP [40] and MATE [24] focused on intra-domain rout-
ing, splitting traffic across already setup tunnels. We would
instead like to tackle the problem from the perspective of an
AS picking routes to external destinations, with no end-host
control, and only observing its own traffic. In this setting, we
discuss several alternatives for monitoring path performance,
whose limitations make the case for ROUTESCOUT.
Active probing: One can actively probe routes [21, 35].
While this approach can be effective in the intra-domain set-
ting, where recent work [34,42] used specially crafted probes
to monitor performance, it is insufficient for our inter-domain
context as probes may not be representative of real traffic’s
performance — the volume of probing traffic is likely or-
ders of magnitude less than the actual traffic, and some ISPs
are known to treat probing traffic preferentially [23]. Several
systems propose to address some of these issues by collect-
ing and combining measurements from end-users [49, 57].
However, requiring large numbers of cooperative users makes
bootstrapping hard.
Passive sampling: Gathering statistics on live traffic is possi-
ble using sampling with sFlow [50] or NetFlow [22]. However,
sampling simply does not capture performance — measuring
these metrics requires capturing state across particular packets
per flow (§4.2, §4.3), not arbitrary random samples.
Mirroring: While mirroring obviously captures the requisite
information, it does not scale and is inflexible. To avoid con-
gestion from mirrored traffic, one can rate-limit it, but this has
limitations similar to sampling: naive rate-limiting will dis-
card arbitrary packets across flows, impairing loss and delay
estimation. Alternatively, one can target mirroring more nar-
rowly, with systems like Everflow [68] and Stroboscope [61].
However, for continuous, high-coverage monitoring across In-
ternet prefixes and potential next-hops, such methods would
require a large and constantly changing set of monitoring
rules in network devices. Further, even if we could dynami-
cally match on a given number of flows per prefix and mirror
only those (e.g., with programmable switches to store flow
identifiers), the mirrored traffic will still be burdensome.
As an illustration, consider an operator who wants to moni-
tor the performance for traffic sent to 1000 destinations over
only 2 alternative next-hops and by mirroring only 50 flows
per destination-next-hop pair. At the mean flow rate observed
in CAIDA traces [1], we find that such a design would require
mirroring 25.7 Gbps of traffic. In contrast, by aggregating
measurements directly in the data plane, ROUTESCOUT gen-
erates 108.4 kbps in performance reports, i.e., at 287,000×
higher efficiency.
2
End-system monitoring: Google [65] and Facebook [55]
have recently shared their solutions for path-aware routing.
These approaches leverage their unique control: one end of
the monitored connections terminates at their own powerful
servers, and the other at a client application that also supplies
performance data. This is obviously infeasible for ASes.
Sketches: Sketches [41, 44, 45, 47, 64, 66] offer aggregate
estimates for packet/flow counts and size distributions, but do
not capture latency and loss across routes.
ROUTESCOUT exploits programmable switches that
open up avenues unavailable to past efforts. To the best of our
knowledge, no prior work leveraging programmable switches
fully addresses either the sensing / monitoring or the con-
trol necessary for performance-aware routing. Blink [33]
uses such switches to detect packet retransmissions. How-
ever, Blink can only detect large outages on a single path,
not congestion and latency differences across multiple paths.
Dapper [30], Lossradar [67], and In-band Network Teleme-
try [42] provide performance metrics, such as lost packets and
queuing delays, but require bidirectional traffic or/and exter-
nal mechanisms to aggregate performance markings. While
Marple [48] could potentially be used to implement perfor-
mance monitoring, it does not run in today’s programmable
switches and does not provide flexible rerouting.
2.1 Design constraints
The following constraints drive ROUTESCOUT’s design:
R1 Respect routing policies: By default, ROUTESCOUT
must select amongst equally-preferred routes, replacing
arbitrary tie-breaks in BGP, and hot-potato routing.
R2 Ensure correctness and stability: ROUTESCOUT must
prevent loops and oscillatory behavior.
R3 Deployability: ROUTESCOUT should not require any
coordination between ASes. A single AS deploying
ROUTESCOUT should also benefit from it without up-
grading its entire network.
R4 Support asymmetric routing: Due to asymmetric rout-
ing, a ROUTESCOUT switch may not see both directions
of traffic, it must, therefore, be able to estimate and im-
prove performance from one-way traffic.
R5 Respect flow affinity: To avoid performance degrada-
tion due to reordering of packets that could result from
sending packets of the same flow across different paths,
ROUTESCOUT must enforce flow-path affinity.
R6 Fit today’s switches: ROUTESCOUT should fit within
the scarce memory (dozens of MB at best [39]), restricted
operations set (e.g., no floating points) and parallel mem-
ory accesses available to existing programmable network
hardware.
R7 Limit bandwidth usage: ROUTESCOUT We must limit
bandwidth usage between the data and control planes,
regardless of the traffic rate and burstness.
Figure 1: ASA and ASB are providers for the other three ASes. ASX
has several legacy switches and a ROUTESCOUT-capable switch;
not all edge switches in ASX run ROUTESCOUT.
3 Overview
ROUTESCOUT is a closed-loop control system that dynami-
cally adapts how a stub AS forwards its outgoing traffic across
multiple policy-compliant routes according to observed per-
formance and operators objectives.
We illustrate ROUTESCOUT operations on a simple running
example (Fig. 1) in which a stub network, ASX , routes traffic
to multiple destinations among which ASC and ASD. ASX
knows two equally-preferred paths to reach both destinations
through its providers, ASA and ASB, with whom ASX has
250 Gbps links. BGP’s arbitrary tie-breaking selects ASA as
the next-hop for traffic to ASC and ASB for traffic to ASD.
Unbeknownst to ASX , the path via ASB has a much lower
delay to ASC and a slightly lower delay to ASD. Only one
(edge) devices of ASX is programmable (R3).
Inputs To use ROUTESCOUT, the operator first speci-
fies the prefixes of interest4, together with their typical
traffic demands.5 In our example, ASX’s operator wants
ROUTESCOUT to optimize for destinations ASC and ASD,
which drive 100 and 200 Gbps of traffic respectively. Then,
the operator specifies her objectives which in our example are
(a) to minimize the delay to both destinations; and (b) to load
balance traffic across the next-hops, as long as delay is not
increased by >10%. Note that ROUTESCOUT automatically
learns the policy-compliant next-hops from BGP (R1).
System To satisfy the operator’s objectives, ROUTESCOUT
implements a control loop which. . .
. . . directs traffic to alternative next-hops
. . . monitors performance across prefix-nexthop pairs
. . . computes an optimized traffic allocation to next-hops
. . . actuates appropriate traffic shifts in the data plane
ROUTESCOUT splits the above functions across its control-
and data-planes (Fig 2). The data-plane collects and aggre-
gates measurements for the control-plane to analyze (sensing).
The control-plane decides which traffic to monitor and which
traffic to reroute to which next-hops (analysis). The data-
plane receives and enforces these decisions (actuation).
ROUTESCOUT sensing and actuation operates at the gran-
ularity of a “slot”, which we define as a small amount of
4few hundreds (in expectation) accounting for most of the traffic [26, 53]
5adequately accurate estimates, are easy to obtain §6.1.
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Figure 2: ROUTESCOUT is a closed-loop control system with sens-
ing, analysis, actuation split across data and control planes.
traffic to a particular prefix. Operating at a per-slot granular-
ity provides measurement efficiency, improved stability and
better resource utilization. For instance, slot-based routing
enables ROUTESCOUT to use paths that can not support all
the traffic for a given prefix.
Coming back to our example, ASD receives twice the traf-
fic as ASC. Assuming a total of 3,000 slots, ROUTESCOUT
allocates 1,000 slots to ASC, and 2,000 slots to ASD, with
each slot carrying around 0.1 Gbps of traffic.
Data plane: ROUTESCOUT data plane enforces the per-
slot monitoring and forwarding decisions made by the con-
trol plane. To scalably monitor effectively satisfying R6,
ROUTESCOUT exploits TCP’s semantics together with proba-
bilistic data structures to analyze the relevant packets, aggre-
gate the measurements(R7), and actuate the corresponding
forwarding decisions (§4). Note that, while ROUTESCOUT
relies on TCP, it only requires some TCP flows to exist per
prefix, meaning it can still be useful even in QUIC-dominated
Internet. To flexibly forward, ROUTESCOUT uses two match-
action tables and a novel memory mapping scheme (§4.1),
that allows it to seamlessly adapt to BGP updates, prefix or
policy changes, consistently satisfying R1
In our example, ROUTESCOUT reroutes 1 slot of traffic to
each destination via the alternative next-hop, namely ASB (as
decided by the control plane) and monitors 4 slots one for
each destination, next-hop pair. As a result, aggregated loss
and delay measurement for each pair will be available to the
control plane.
Control plane: ROUTESCOUT control plane pulls aggregated
data plane measurements, and computes a new forwarding
state based on these and the operator objectives (§6.2) by
formulating and solving a linear optimization program(§6.2).
The main challenge in computing a new forwarding state
is the conflicting objectives that the operators often have. In
our example, the operator wants low delay (primary) and bal-
anced load (secondary). These cannot be satisfied together as
ASB offers lower delay for both destinations. This is a delib-
erately simple example: since performance for ASC improves
more, ASD’s traffic should be load balanced. But the problem
becomes more complex as the number of prefixes, next-hops,
and objectives grows.
ROUTESCOUT moves to the computed forwarding state
Figure 3: ROUTESCOUT uses two match-action tables to flexibly
forward the traffic according to the control-plane decisions and
flexibly monitor a given fraction of traffic per next hop.
on a slot-by-slot basis while tracking and reactive any per-
formance degradation to avoid heavily congesting remote
bottlenecks potentially violating R2. Slot-by-slot traffic shifts
also reduce the risk of oscillations, even when multiple
ROUTESCOUT systems co-exist, by adding randomness and
therefore avoiding synchronization [29]
4 ROUTESCOUT Data Plane
ROUTESCOUT’s data plane uses compact data structures and
efficient algorithms to flexibly forward traffic (§4.1) and accu-
rately measure delay (§4.2) and loss (§4.3). We also discuss
the impact of adversarial inputs and defenses (§4.4).
4.1 Selector stage
The Selector enforces the forwarding and monitoring deci-
sions communicated by the control plane (§3) on a per-prefix
basis. The forwarding decisions correspond to the number of
slots to forward to given next hops, while the monitoring de-
cisions correspond to the number of slots to collect statistics
for on given next hops.
The Selector implements slot-based forwarding and moni-
toring by first hashing each incoming packet to a range [0, k]
and then using two match-action tables to identify sub-ranges
[i, j) of of the range [0, k] that need to be to be monitored or
forwarded to a given port. The two tables, forwarding Selector
and monitoring Selector, use the same type of keys composed
of: (i) a prefix; and (ii) a range [i, j) which identifies a subset
of traffic. In the forwarding Selector table, each key maps to
a next hop. In the monitoring Selector table, each key maps
to the index of a memory block of a table (aggregator (§4.2-
4.3)) in which the corresponding aggregated statistics will be
stored. By adapting the contents of each table, the controller
can flexibly adapt the forwarding and monitoring behavior.
Example: Fig. 3 shows an example with a hash range of
0-100, and 3 rules in each table. The rules are such that, in
expectation, 30% of packets (subrange 0–30) to prefix ‘prefX’
will be forwarded to port 4. Additionally, 1/3 of these packets
(subrange 0–10) will be monitored before being forwarded,
with the monitoring results stored in index 1 of the aggregator.
Observe that the flexible design of the monitoring Selector
table allow seamless adaptation to the system’s dynamics. For
example if the BGP peer at port 4 withdraws prefX, then the
range of the green (second) rule in the forwarding Selector
could be expanded to include hash outputs 0-30, and the red
(first) rules in both the forwarding Selector and monitoring
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Figure 4: Delay monitor:(a) SYNs of different flows (blue/above &
yellow/below) increment different indexes; (b) The first ACK of the
yellow flow checks that all its indexes (3,5,8) are set, and reads the
timestamp of the yellow SYN from the reversible index 8; (c) The
same ACK removes the footprint of the yellow flow by XOR-ing T3
to the indexes of (3,5,8), and decrementing their counters.
Selector will be deleted. The index 1 of the aggregator used
to store measurements for this prefix-nexthop pair can also be
reset and assigned to another one.
4.2 Measuring delays
This component is responsible for accurately and scalably
measuring the delay of any flow belonging to one of the mon-
itoring slots enforced by the Selector. It relies on a monitor
and an aggregator. The monitor estimates the delay observed
by each flow by tracking specific TCP metadata, while the
aggregator accumulates these statistics which are eventually
pulled by the control plane.
Estimating delay: To estimate the delay of a given flow in the
presence of asymmetric routing, the Delay monitor computes
the time elapsed between its TCP SYN and the first ACK
(similarly to [38]). While doing so means that ROUTESCOUT
only measures delay at connection setup, it also minimizes
the noise from application-level effects which are likely to be
more significant for later packets.
Recording timestamps at scale is challenging. Indeed, sim-
ply storing the SYN timestamp and the 5-tuple in a hash table
does not scale since it requires >100 bits per measurement.
To address this problem, we use a combination of two proba-
bilistic data structures: an Accumulator, for storing sums of
timestamps at each index, and a Counter for counting how
many timestamps are in each sum in the Accumulator. In
essence, the Counter can be seen as a Counting Bloom Fil-
ter [25], while the Accumulator is similar to an Invertible
Bloom Lookup Table [32]. We use XOR (⊕) as sum operator
rather than a simple addition — while both + and ⊕ are re-
coverable (given A and A⊕B or A+B, one can recover B), ⊕
cannot cause overflows. Unlike previous works [44, 67] that
send their full Bloom filters to the controller to be decoded
(incurring both compute and bandwidth expense), we measure
entirely in the data plane, and only expose aggregated statis-
tics to the control plane which can pull them asynchronously.
Example, Fig. 4: As SYNs of different flows arrive (Fig. 4a),
we hash their 5-tuples with multiple hash functions, thus gen-
erating multiple indexes. Here the yellow (lower) flow is
hashed to (3,5,8), and the blue (upper) flow to (1,3,6). Each
entry of the Accumulator in those indexes is ⊕-ed with the
timestamp of the SYN. Additionally, the Counter of each
entry is incremented. Different SYNs can end updating the
same index, e.g., index 3 in Fig. 4a.
On receiving an ACK, we first compute the corresponding
indexes using the same hash functions. If all the correspond-
ing Counter values are non-zero, then we know that the SYN
timestamp is contained in the Counter. In Fig. 4b, the ACK
of the yellow flow arrives and finds its indexes set. To get
the timestamp of its corresponding SYN, we need to find one
index among the indexes to which the ACK is hashed, whose
value in the Counter is one. We will call this index reversible.
The same index in the Accumulator yields the timestamp
for this flow’s SYN, thus allowing us to compute its delay.
In Fig. 4b, the ACK finds a value equal to 1 in the index 8,
namely the third of the three indexes it is hashed to. Thus, the
timestamp of the SYN is at index 8 in the Accumulator.
To erase the footprint of a SYN from the Delay monitor,
we decrement each of the hashed indexes in the Counter, and
⊕ the recovered timestamp with the sums at these indexes in
the Accumulator. In Fig. 4c, we illustrate the result of this
process; observe that by ⊕-ing the timestamp in each of the
hashed indexes, the effect of the yellow SYN vanishes.
Keeping the Delay monitor healthy: In the common case,
the Delay monitor stores some per-flow state only during
the handshake as an ACK removes the memory footprint
created by the corresponding SYN. This allows the Delay
monitor to scale with the number of flows regardless of their
rate and duration. Still, a large number of SYNs not followed
by corresponding ACKs can pollute the Delay monitor. This
challenge can be easily addressed by keeping track of the
number of SYNs in the Delay monitor and not add new ones
if the filter has exceeded its capacity (number of elements it
can store based on allocated memory, §7.2). Alternatively, the
filter can be reset periodically.
Aggregating statistics: The aggregator stores the delay mea-
surements per prefix-nexthop pair in an array with two values
per index: one for storing the sum of the delays and one for
storing the number of delay measurements contained in the
former. The control plane can pull the measurements for a
prefix-nexthop pair or for all pairs at once, and calculate the
mean delay. For example, in Fig. 4c, once the ACK has read
the timestamp of its SYN it calculates the time elapsed since
then and update the values in the index that is mapped to
its prefix and output port. The mapping between the prefix-
nexthop pair and the index in the aggregator is assigned by
the control plane and communicated via the monitoring Se-
lector. Thus, to monitor different prefixes or different number
of next hops for some prefixes, one just changes this mapping
instead of re-allocating memory and needing recompilation
(see example in §4.1).
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Figure 5: Here the Loss monitor sees three packet arrivals, 2 in-order
and 1 retransmit. The first, with sequence number S:5500 has the
next expected sequence number E:6500, and inserts the latter into
the CBF by incrementing the indexes corresponding to the E:6500
(blue indexes, 1, 3, and 4). The second packets finds its indexes (now
yellow, 1, 3, and 4) non-zero, thus knows it was expected. It cleans
itself out, and inserts the next expected packet (blue indexes, lower) .
The third one, a retransmit, finds one of its indexes (2) unset.
4.3 Measuring loss rates
The design and challenges of the loss measurement compo-
nent are similar to those for delay with some key distinctions.
In particular, to measure the loss rate, the monitor tracks the
amount of re-transmitted and regular packets, while the ag-
gregator accumulates the counts for each category.
Estimating loss rate: Measuring retransmissions at scale is
challenging since one cannot simply store every packet and
compare new arrivals against the past history to identify du-
plicates. Our solution, somewhat surprisingly, requires only a
few bits per flow, at the cost of one minor compromise: the in-
ability to distinguish reordering from retransmissions. Given
that reordering also hurts TCP [15], mistakenly accounting
for it as loss is not a significant downside, if it is one at all.
Our solution keeps only one element per flow by exploiting
TCP semantics and the fact that, given a TCP packet p, one
can compute the next expected sequence number based on p
sequence number and payload length. By storing this expected
sequence number, we can check whether the next packet is
either a retransmission or an out-of-order packet. Instead of
storing a 16-bit (expected) sequence number, e, we can in-
sert it into a counting bloom filter (CBF), i.e., the same data
structure as our Counter for delay estimation. Since, packets
across flows can share sequence numbers, we insert the con-
catenation of the 5-tuple with the sequence number instead.
Increasing the length of the inserted value is immaterial, as
the length of the hash output is the same.
Whenever a packet with sequence number s arrives, we
check the CBF for <5-tuple, s>: If the entry does not exist,
the packet is out-of-order or a retransmit. If the entry exists,
the packet is in-order and we delete it from our filter by decre-
menting all the indexes <5-tuple, s> hashes to. We then insert
the next expected packet by incrementing all the indexes that
<5-tuple, s+ tcp.len> hashes to.
Not all packets carry information regarding previous seg-
ments. For instance, an ACK that does not carry any TCP data
will be followed by a packet of the same sequence number
regardless of whether the former was lost or not. Similarly,
KEEPALIVE messages (commonly used in Web traffic) con-
tain an “unexpected” sequence number: one byte less than
the previously sent sequence number. To avoid these issues,
we only use packets with TCP payload. This does not disrupt
functionality, as for every non-zero-payload packet whose
subsequent sequence number we store, there will be a non-
zero-payload packet that can remove it, even if it comes after
multiple zero-payload ACKS.
Example, Fig. 5: In this example, we illustrate how 3 packets
(the last one being a retransmitted one) of a flow update the
CBF. The yellow (upper) box contains their sequence number,
and the blue box (lower), the sequence number of the expected
packet. The first packet inserts the fingerprint of the expected
(second) one by incrementing the values stored in the indexes
that the expected sequence number (concatenated with the
5-tuple of the flow) hashes to (blue indexes). Thus, when
the second packet arrives, it will find all hashed indexes of its
sequence number set (yellow indexes), and will consider itself
expected. This is not true for the third packet whose indexes
are not all set and is a retransmit.
Keeping the monitor healthy: Similarly to the Delay moni-
tor, the Loss monitor contains one item per flow regardless of
its rate as the structure “cleans itself” with incoming packets.
In particular, once a flow terminates, the corresponding RST
or a FIN removes the flow permanently. Still, out-of-order and
lost packets will, in most cases, cause some packets to stay
in the filter. However, this represents a very small fraction of
packets, as we discuss in §7.3. To avoid overflowing the mon-
itor, a counter in the data plane can keep track of the number
of flows using it. If the filter’s capacity is exceeded, insertions
are stalled until some of the flows terminate. Alternatively,
the filter can be reset periodically as we show in §7.3.
Aggregating statistics: Similarly to the Delay aggregator,
the aggregator stores the number of expected and unexpected
packets observed per prefix and next hop.
4.4 Dealing with adversarial inputs
Like any data-driven system, ROUTESCOUT is prone to at-
tacks in which malicious end-points or networks aim at faking
signals in order to influence its decisions. While possible, and
deserving a complete analysis in a follow-up work, we briefly
argue why such attacks on ROUTESCOUT are hard to perform.
In order to influence ROUTESCOUT’s decisions, a mali-
cious end-point could try to: (i) send repeated packets to fake
retransmissions; or (ii) send fake pairs of SYNs and ACKs
with a small/large timing differences to fool the delay monitor.
We note two things. First, such adversarial end points must
be hosted within the stub AS, since ROUTESCOUT optimizes
exit traffic. Assuming basic anti-spoofing techniques are in
place (e.g. [56]), each end point has a single IP address to
source traffic from. As such, limiting the number of flows
tracked per IP would be sufficient to mitigate the attack. Sec-
ond, ROUTESCOUT randomly associates a flow to a next hop,
depending on a hash function. As such, the attacker is equally
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Figure 6: (a) We implement the Delay monitor as a series of arrays;
(b) A packet can either check if it is expected or insert the next
expected packet in the Loss monitor.
likely to add noise to measurements of all next hops, making
targeting one next-hop difficult. ROUTESCOUT can also de-
feat attempts to use traceroutes for probing such decisions by
randomly forwarding traceroutes to next hops.
Similarly, a malicious transit network can: (i) drop packets
to increase the loss rate; or (ii) drop/delay SYNs, SYN/ACK,
or ACKs to fool the delay monitor. While this is possible, we
note that, by doing so, malicious networks can only make their
performance worse, not better. As such, malicious networks
can only push away traffic, not attract more. Observe, that an
attacker cannot craft a SYN/ACK packet for every SYN it
receives to fake low latency as she does not know the sequence
number that the receiver will use until the actual SYN/ACK
packet is received.
Finally, attackers can also attempt to pollute
ROUTESCOUT’s data structures. An efficient way to
mitigate such pollution is to periodically reset the data
structures, as we discuss in §7.
5 Hardware Design
Our design needs modification to fit a real Protocol Indepen-
dent Switch Architecture (PISA) switch. We briefly explain
the key constraints imposed by PISA and how we adapted
the Delay and Loss monitors accordingly. We have tested our
design in a Barefoot Tofino Wedge 100BF-32X.
PISA constraints: A packet traversing a PISA switch goes
through a pipeline of stages. Besides the limited memory and
instruction set, which our design already addresses, there are
constraints on the sequence of memory accesses [13,63]. First,
a packet cannot read or write multiple memory addresses in
the same memory block. Second, memory blocks are tied to a
single stage in the pipeline and can only be accessed in it. This
is to avoid contention from stages processing different packets
simultaneously. Similarly, accessing stages in a different order
or multiple times per packet is not possible.
Delay Monitor modifications: To access any kind of Bloom
Filter, including those in the Delay Monitor, we need to access
multiple indexes, each corresponding to the output of a hash.
For instance, in Fig. 4a, the yellow SYN would need to access
three indexes corresponding to the yellow indexes. In PISA
though, one cannot concurrently access multiple indexes of
the same memory block. We thus divide the two tables of
the monitor into smaller chunks, and constrain each hash to
index a single chunk as seen in Fig. 6a. Now, chunks reside in
different stages of the pipeline and can be accessed serially.
Serializing accesses creates another issue. Particularly,
when an ACK arrives, the monitor first needs to find out
if it corresponds to the first ACK of a flow whose SYN is
in the Accumulator (Fig. 4b), and if so, decrement all cor-
responding indexes in the Counter. For this, the SYN will
need to traverse all three pipeline stages in Fig. 6a to check
whether all corresponding indexes of the Counter are non-
zero. But after doing so, the packet cannot return to stage
1 and decrease their values in the Counter. To address this,
the monitor recirculates packets corresponding to first ACKs.
Observe that even if we could rely on SYNACK, which is
impractical due to asymmetric routing, we would still not be
able to avoid recirculation. Indeed, even if an incoming ACK
knew upon arrival that the timestamp of the corresponding
SYN is in the structure, it will still need to find a reversible
index to read this timestamp and then ⊕ it to all (previous)
stages. As an illustration, in Fig. 6a, the reversible index is in
stage 3. At the time the packet reads it, it can no longer return
to stages 1 and 2, and ⊕ it to the corresponding indexes.
Loss Monitor modifications: Similarly here, we need to split
the CBF into multiple chunks and stages. Recall that every
incoming packet needs to check if it is expected, remove itself,
and insert the next expected packet in the CBF. This results
in two violations of the PISA constraints.
First, a packet needs to access each memory chunk (in
each stage) in two different indexes, one corresponding to
the output of itself, whose value it needs to decrement, and
one corresponding to the next expected packet, whose value it
needs to increase. Second, the former access is conditioned on
whether the packet is expected or a re-transmission something
which will only be known after the packet traversed all stages.
To address the first violation, we allow each packet one of
the two operations, either to remove itself, if it is expected,
or to insert the next expected one iteratively. To achieve this,
we keep track of the number of packets seen by each flow.
Particularly, when a packet arrives, it checks the number of
non-zero-payload packets its flow has already sent. If this
number is even, as for S:5500 and S:7500 in Fig. 6b, then the
packet will insert the next expected one in the CBF. If the
number is odd, as for S:6500 in Fig. 6b, the packet will try to
find its footprint in the CBF and remove it. We use a counting
bloom filter to efficiently keep track of the number of packets.
To address the second violation, we assume all packets to be
expected and recirculate packets that violate this assumption.
In more detail, on arrival, a packet whose flow has sent an
odd number of packets reads and decrements the indexes
corresponding to it in the CBF. If the packet was indeed
expected, i.e., all read values are non-zero (as for S:6500 in
Fig. 6b), the packet increments the Accumulator and leaves
the device. If the packet was a retransmission, it is recirculated
to re-increment the indexes it wrongly decremented.
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6 ROUTESCOUT Control Plane
In this section, we describe ROUTESCOUT’s control plane
and how it leverages measurements from the data plane to
improve forwarding decisions. We start by describing the
control-plane inputs (§6.1). We then explain how it solves the
induced optimization problem (§6.2).
We describe the simplest version of the control plane that
would enable performance-driven routing and support conflict-
ing operator objectives. To cover additional operational needs,
this control plane can be extended for instance to strengthen
stability guarantees as shown in [29].
6.1 Inputs
ROUTESCOUT triggers the Solver periodically giving as input
a description of the environment, a set of objectives, and op-
tionally, some additional constraints for each prefix, together
with fresh performance statistics.
Environment: The network environment includes topologi-
cal, traffic, and routing information. The former two are pro-
vided by the operator and the latter by BGP. Topological
information corresponds to the set of direct next-hops and
their link capacities. Traffic information consists of the set
of prefixes that ROUTESCOUT should optimize for, together
with the volumes they drive. Routing information corresponds
to the set of next-hops that ROUTESCOUT can use to route
each prefix (obtained from routing tables and BGP policies).
Expecting traffic information is reasonable as important
prefixes are few and stable over time [26, 53]. The traf-
fic volumes to these prefixes can also be estimated accu-
rately [37, 52]. Note that inaccurate traffic volumes won’t
affect ROUTESCOUT’s performance if the direct links are not
running at full capacity which is true in most stub ISPs. If
that’s not the case, ROUTESCOUT might indeed not find the
optimal solution but will never deteriorate the performance
by moving traffic to a worse next hop.
Objectives: The operator can decide whether they want to:
(i) optimize for delay and/or loss; (ii) minimize the number
of traffic shifts necessary to meet the requirements; or (iii)
load-balance traffic by minimizing the difference between the
most- and the least-used next-hop. Linear combinations of
these or similar other objectives are easily implementable.
ROUTESCOUT also allows multiple objectives to be flex-
ibly implemented. To do so, the operator needs to express
how important each objective is by defining priorities and
how valuable are the differences among alternative forward-
ing states by defining tolerance levels. Objectives with lower
priority will only be optimized if there are multiple equally-
preferred solutions, namely solutions that differ from the op-
timal by no more than the tolerance level. For example, an
operator might want to balance the load across the next-hops,
as long as the delay difference between the best- and the used
next-hop is lower than 10%. The operator can communicate
this to ROUTESCOUT by giving a high priority to delay with
10% tolerance, and a lower priority to load-balancing.
Operational constraints: ROUTESCOUT admits con-
straints of two types: (i) those that limit the number of next-
hops traffic can be spread on; and (ii) those that define per-
formance constraints. Constraining the maximum number of
next-hops per destination might be useful, for instance, to ease
debugging. Performance constraints are maximum loss/delay
values that traffic for a certain destination should experience.
Defining such objectives is useful for meeting Service Level
Agreements (SLAs), or particular application requirements.
Data plane statistics: ROUTESCOUT periodically pulls mea-
surements of loss and delay aggregated per prefix and next-
hop from the respective aggregators.
6.2 Solver
The solver is responsible for synthesizing a forwarding state.
To do so, it formulates each of the operator’s inputs into a
constraint or an objective, creating a linear optimization prob-
lem.
Problem statement: Let N be a set of next-hops and Pr the
set of destination prefixes to optimize for. Let Pa ⊆ Pr×N
be the set of all pairs of destinations and equally-preferred
next-hops (learned by BGP). The goal is to find a mapping
Ft : Pa → N, namely the number of slots allocated to each
pair (prefix, next-hop) at time t such that it optimizes the
operator’s objectives, while adhering to the environmental
and operational contraints. We implement the Solver using
Gurobi [3].
7 Evaluation
We evaluate ROUTESCOUT’s Delay monitor (§7.2), Loss mon-
itor (§7.3) and Solver (§7.4). For the monitors, we investi-
gate the trade-off between accuracy and memory footprint
using real traffic traces and our practical hardware design (§5).
We find that, with 1 MB of memory, the Delay monitor can
accurately measure the delay of hundreds of thousands of
flows/sec. Moreover, the Loss monitor can accurately mea-
sure loss rate of 36K flows/sec with as little as 312KB of
memory. For the Solver, we focus on runtime, and show that
it computes forwarding states for thousands of destinations,
across tens of next hops and for various objectives, in less
than a second.
7.1 Methodology
To evaluate ROUTESCOUT’s monitors we estimate the mem-
ory they use as a function of their accuracy via both theoretical
and practical means. For the theoretical analysis, we assume
perfectly behaved TCP traffic (in-order, with expected seman-
tics), with flow rates derived from real traces, and the original
design as described in §4.2, §4.3 with 9 hash functions6 and
without any additional hardware limitations. For the practical
analysis, we use real traffic traces and our hardware design
for Tofino, with only 2 hash functions7.
6We chose 9 following the Bloom Filters heuristic [16].
7More engineering effort might allow an implementation of more hashes.
8
 0
 5
 10
 15
 20
 25
 0  5  10  15  20  25  30
N
on
-In
ve
rti
bi
lit
y 
(%
)
Time (sec)
160K
320K
640K
(a) The probability of an ACK to decode
its SYN’s timestamp is >95% with a 1MB
(640K elems) Delay monitor of 2 hashes.
 0
 2
 4
 6
 8
 10
 12
 14
 16
 0  5  10  15  20  25  30
Lo
ss
 In
ac
cu
ra
cy
Time (sec)
160K
320K
640K
(b) Using 625KB (640K elems) and 2
hashes, the Loss monitor calculates the loss
rate with high accuracy.
Target 50th 70th 95th
# moves 0.02 0.03 0.29
balance 0.03 0.04 0.4
performance 0.08 0.3 1.09
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(c) Runtime percentiles in seconds depend
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Figure 7
For the theoretical analysis, we use two different direc-
tions of CAIDA traces (CAIDA.A, CAIDA.B) collected at
the Equinix-Chicago monitor in March 2018 [1], and one
from MAWI [20] from January 2018. Together, these contain
∼6 billion packets with an average rate ranging from 240-
3200 Mbps. For the practical analysis, we use the CAIDA.A
trace, which is the noisiest, and feed it to the monitors in 100
chunks of 30 seconds. While none of those traces are from a
stub network, this has no impact on our analysis, as we are
only interested in estimating accuracy and resource usage.
7.2 Delay monitor
Accuracy metric: We calculate the invertibility, namely the
probability of a successfully computed delay. The delay be-
tween a SYN and its corresponding ACK can be successfully
computed if upon arrival of the ACK, there is at least one
index that contains only the timestamp of the SYN. Other
than the memory used, invertibility depends on the number of
concurrent delay measurements, the number of hash functions
used, and the pollution of the structure due to traffic noise,
e.g., SYNs that are not followed by ACKs.
Theoretical analysis: In theory, invertibility is the inverse of
the probability of false positive in a regular Bloom Filter: the
probability of a SYN being ⊕ed to indexes which all con-
tain other timestamps is the same as finding all hash outputs
set in a regular Bloom Filter during a lookup. We calculate
the memory requirements for an invertibility of 99.9% (false
positive rate in BF of 0.1%) using the analytical formula for
optimal Bloom Filter design [16]. For these calculations, we
assume that each handshake completes in <1 sec, and that
ROUTESCOUT needs to monitor all flows in each trace. The
results are summarized in Table 1. The Delay monitor would
need 12.9K-781.5K elements, corresponding to 6KB–381KB
memory assuming an implementation over an array of 16-bit
values using 9 hash functions.
Practical analysis: In practice, the filter is gradually polluted
by SYNs that are not followed by ACKs. This can happen,
e.g., under SYN attacks, or when hosts try to reach an offline
server. Such noise is common in our traces: in the noisiest
trace (which we use for this evaluation), only 40% of the
SYNs are followed by ACKs. Fig. 7a shows the median, max,
Trace SYNs/s Elements Delay M Flows/s Elements Loss M
CAIDA.A 3.8K 54.2K 26KB 36.8K 529.1K 1MB
CAIDA.B 54.4K 781.5K 381KB 233.8K 3361.3K 6MB
MAWI 899 12.9K 6KB 3.3K 47.8K 93KB
Table 1: Delay monitor and Loss monitor would combined need
6.4M to monitor as many flows/s as there are in the CAIDA.B trace.
and min non-invertibility probability as a function of time
using {160K, 320K, 640K} elements in the data structure.
As expected, the failure probability increases with time as
the filter gets polluted. Still, ROUTESCOUT is very efficient.
Indeed, a Delay monitor with only 320K elements has an
invertibility of >90%. Another interesting insight is that we
can do this with less memory if we periodically reset our
Delay monitor, e.g., with only 160K elements (312KB), we
get the same >90% invertibility if we reset it every 15 seconds.
7.3 Loss monitor
Accuracy metric: We compare the measured loss per flow
to its actual loss rate. ROUTESCOUT’s accuracy is affected
by false positives: a retransmitted packet can be considered
expected (instead of correctly being assessed as unexpected)
and thus not counted towards loss, if all the indexes it hashes
to are set. As the Loss monitor is a CBF, its false positive rate
depends on the memory and the number of hashes used.
Theoretical analysis: We use the same method as for the De-
lay monitor, to calculate memory requirements for achieving
a false positive rate of <0.1%. The results are summarized
in Table 1. The Loss monitor would need 47.8K–3.4M el-
ements depending on the number of flows/sec in the trace.
This corresponds to 93K–6M memory, if the Loss monitor is
implemented as an array of 4-bit values with 9 hash functions.
Practical analysis: In practice, the Loss monitor’s accuracy is
deteriorated by three more factors. First, out-of-order packets
are not only classified as losses, but also pollute the structure
as explained in §4.3. Second, flows terminating unexpectedly
(i.e., without FIN/RST) remain in the monitor until it is reset,
decreasing its effective capacity. Third, the Loss monitor can
miss some loss events due to the compromise for PISA con-
straints: it only checks whether every other non-zero-payload
packet has the right sequence number.
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Despite these impairments, ROUTESCOUT is in practice,
very accurate. Fig. 7b shows the (max, min, and median across
all runs) 70th percentile of difference across all flows between
their estimated loss rate and the ground truth reported by
tshark. We plot 70th as lower percentiles have zero error,
and thus unsuitable for studying the memory trade-off. We
find that a Loss monitor with only 640K elements (625KB
assuming 4bits/element) is almost perfect for 30 sec. Like the
Delay monitor, resetting every 15 sec would allow smaller
implementations to be similarly accurate.
7.4 Solver runtime
We investigate the influence of each parameter of the opera-
tional environment (§6.2) on the Solver’s runtime.
Methodology: We evaluate runtime, i.e., the time the Solver
takes to compute a forwarding state, across several scenarios
with different numbers of prefixes, next-hops, and slots. For
each scenario, we run >5500 experiments with four different
objectives: performance, balance across next-hops, minimal
number of steps, and all of these combined. We fix all but one
of the three parameters (i.e., prefixes, next-hops, and slots)
to default values. By default, we set the number of prefixes
to 800 (corresponding to 80% of the traffic of CAIDA.A);
the number of next-hops to 3, and the number of slots to be
200 (corresponding to the minimum traffic-shift granularity
of 0.5% of the traffic per prefix). We report the median, 70th,
and 95th percentile runtime as a function of each parameter in
Fig. 8. We also group our experiments by objective and report
median, 70th, and 95th percentile runtime in Table 7c.
Key results: Fig 8 shows that the 95th-percentile runtime is
0.25 sec for 22 slots per prefix (left), 0.1 sec for 10 next-hops
per prefix (center), and 0.05 sec for 2K prefixes (right). As
Table 7c shows, the runtime also depends on the complexity
of the objective. The most efficient objective to solve for is
minimizing the number of shifted slots, while the least effi-
cient one, unsurprisingly, is the combination of all objectives.
In nearly all cases, the Solver finishes in under one second.
8 Case studies
We validate ROUTESCOUT’s practicality and effectiveness in
three steps. First, we prove that it is deployable by running it
on a real testbed composed of Barefoot Tofino [5] switches.
We then measure the benefits of running ROUTESCOUT
for 10 stub ASes. Finally, we highlight the effectiveness of
ROUTESCOUT in a larger testbed using P416.
8.1 Hardware testbed
We implement our hardware design (§5) on a Barefoot Tofino
Wedge 100BF-32X in which a control process pulls statistics
every 1 second, and updates routing accordingly.
Our testbed (Fig. 9a) has two Tofinos (SW1 and SW2) and
two servers (s1 and s2). SW1–SW2 are connected to each
other with two links via ports 1 and 2, creating two s1–s2
paths. SW1 runs ROUTESCOUT and splits traffic to s2 across
the two links. SW2 randomly drops a configurable portion of
incoming packets matching on a specified ingress port.
We partition traffic to s2 into 16 slots. Thus, the minimum
portion of traffic ROUTESCOUT can reroute/monitor is 1/16
in this configuration. (More generally, anything from 12 − 1232
is feasible.) We assume the operator wants to minimize loss
for traffic to s2. We also assume that the default next-hop for
traffic to s1 is port 1, i.e., the green (top) path. ROUTESCOUT
thus routes most traffic (15/16) on it, using one slot to probe
the other path. We use 81 iperf [36] client-servers pairs to
generate s1→ s2 traffic. At time t1 = 7 sec, we introduce
0.8% loss on the top path using SW2.
Fig. 9b and Fig. 9c show how the flow-count and traffic
at each port evolve. Initially, port 1 sees 76 flows (4.3 Gbps)
while port 2 sees only 5 flows (0.4 Gbps). At t1, loss starts, and
bandwidth across the green path drops as TCP reacts. This is
quickly detected (< 2sec) by ROUTESCOUT, which installs
new rules to shift almost all the traffic to port 2. ROUTESCOUT
could be made faster by (for instance) increasing the polling
rate for statistics. A pure data-plane system that forgoes a con-
troller will, of course, be even faster, but lose ROUTESCOUT’s
flexibility in terms of optimization goals, and its stability.
8.2 Achievable gains in the wild
Quantifying the gains provided by ROUTESCOUT is challeng-
ing for three main reasons: (i) one needs to control egress
routing of the tested stub AS; (ii) multiple stub ASes need
to be tested for the results to be meaningful; (iii) running the
full system using previously collected traces is problematic
as the traffic is not responsive to ROUTESCOUT’s operations
(e.g. a lost packet will not be retransmitted).
To circumvent those limitations, we leverage (i) the RIPE
ATLAS platform [4] which gives us access to multiple mea-
surement probes in many stub ASes all over the world; and
(ii) the fact that some stubs host multiple probes whose traffic
exits via different next-hops (due to hot potato routing), and
therefore take different paths.
In particular, we measure the delay difference among paths
with same pair of source-AS and destination IP but differ-
ent first nexthop. We believe this measurement is a rea-
sonable proxy for the RTT improvement achievable with
ROUTESCOUT. Every 5 minutes,8 we perform 2 concur-
rent traceroutes from 2 probes in the same AS, to each of
the top-50 Alexa [6] destinations and report the diffrence in
median delay observed by the two probes per pair of destina-
tion and 5-min interval iff they used a different next hop. We
perform this experiment for 24 hours, and repeat it for 10 stub
ASes.9 Fig. 10 shows the CDF of potential RTT improvement.
Each line corresponds to a particular stub AS.
8The maximum probing frequency allowed by RIPE ATLAS.
9The selection of ASes was done such that there is at least one pair of
probes a, b in ASX ; which are geographically close to each other; and use
different ASes, say nextHopA and nextHopB to reach the same destination
prefix say p, which is among the 50 most popular Web destinations.
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Figure 8: ROUTESCOUT is fast even when run with an increasing number of slots, next hops and destinations.
(a) Two Tofinos set up two s1-s2 paths.
SW1 runs ROUTESCOUT and SW2 intro-
duces loss in between the experiment.
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Figure 9
Figure 10: CDF of the relative RTT improvement each source AS
should expect from delay-aware routing. 8 of the 10 ASes could
improve the latency of at least 20% of the cases by 12–99%.
We find that 9/10 ASes could improve their RTTs in more
than 35% of the cases by a 5–99% For 6 ASes, RTT would
improve by more than 21% in at least 20% of the cases, while
for 2 of them, RTT improvement would exceed 97%.
8.3 ROUTESCOUT in a network
We implement ROUTESCOUT in the P4 behavioral model
(BMV2) [7] using ∼900 lines of P416. We emulate a network
scenario with a stub that runs ROUTESCOUT and 10 destina-
tion networks towards each of which it has 3 next-hops. The
network scenario has 14 ASes, and 33 10 Mbps AS-to-AS
links. The end-end delays are configured based on the latency
differences observed in our RIPE experiments (§8.2). We as-
sume that BGP has selected the first next hop for all prefixes.
The goal of ROUTESCOUT’s operator is to minimize delay.
We use D-ITG [17] to create 10 TCP flows of constant rate
to each of the destinations, resulting in 0.2 Mbps of aggre-
gated traffic. We configure ROUTESCOUT to use 50 slots in
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Figure 11: CDF of % delay improvement with ROUTESCOUT.
total; as all prefixes drive the same traffic volume, each gets 5
slots. We run the experiment 10 times and report (Fig. 11) the
CDF of improvement on the average end-end delay compared
with the initial state. We see that ROUTESCOUT improves the
delay in half of the cases by 32% or more.
9 Conclusion
ROUTESCOUT is a modern answer to the old problem of
performance-aware Internet routing. Leveraging the capabil-
ities of programmable switches, ROUTESCOUT continually
and accurately monitors paths performance at scale with low
compute, memory, and bandwith footprints. Based on these
measurements, ROUTESCOUT control plane then reroute traf-
fic along policy-equivalent paths, fulfilling the operators’ ob-
jectives. ROUTESCOUT is BGP-compatible, deployable with-
out coordination across ASes and without network-wide up-
dates, improving Internet routing one switch at a time.
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